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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDWARD DON GREEN, : Case No. 992081-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Attempted 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§§ 
76-6-404 (1995) (Theft), § 76-6-412(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998) (Theft 
From A Person), 76-4-101 (1995) and 76-4-102 (Supp. 1998) (Attempt 
And Classification Of Second Degree Offense As Third Degree 
Offense), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 
(1996). See Addendum A (judgment and conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion 
to quash the second degree charge of theft from a person, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1998) or, 
alternatively, reduce the charge to the class B misdemeanor offense 
of theft involving an amount less than $300, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (d) (Supp. 1998) where both crimes proscribe 
the same conduct yet the latter carries a lesser penalty? 
Standard of Review: The issue presented on appeal is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness without deference to the 
trial court's determination. See State v. Vocrt, 824 P.2d 455, 456 
(Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's motion to reduce the charge from Theft From a 
person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (iv), to theft of property valued at 
less than $3 00, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(d) (Supp. 1998), is preserved on 
the record ("R.") for appeal at 24-41,90. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are 
determinative of the issues on appeal. Their text is provided in 
full in Addendum B. 
Theft -- Elements, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) ; 
Theft -- Classification of Offenses -- Action for Treble 
Damages, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1998); 
Article I, Section 2, Utah Constitution; 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution; 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
Appellant Edward Don Green ("Green") was charged by 
information with one count of robbery from a person, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1) (a) 
2 
(Supp. 19 98). R.5. An arrest warrant was issued. R.l "When 
Green wa s arrested 1 i€ wa s f• : i n id :i i 1 j: Dssessiii on of a ma] : :i jn lai la pi pe 
during , ailhouse search. R 7 r- .idn.g^/, Green was 
additionally charged wi th unlawful oossess: on of drug 
paraphen la ] :i a ., E : 1 a .ss B n: i: i :ii sdemeano c f I Jta 1 i C :>de 
Ann, § 5 8 -37 a-5 (19 9 8) . R 6. 
At +~he preliminary hearina held or. November 3 7, 1998, Green 
1
 I ] f! s t : :i : ::> b b e i: y, G i e e n 
argued that the Sta:;e diet :.':;: establish uhe use of force or fear, 
an e^emen*" ^f "Wf-- ffense • * - rrepcnderan.ee :>f the evidence. 
: -i-j-^;. - -- J • tl l E i- . .- .-r "k-xc- . / 
lacking regarding the charge of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia. A.89 [32]. 
"::.e d a t e agreed at t;._ Hearing to dismiss cou: . av. i_l 
possession of drug paraphernalia. '- .89 [32 "he Stare similarly 
r'-'-r:---.ipri -'•-•-, * • t- - •; i^r r*• ::' ri - frsr.abl: :-• ". "force" for purposes 
of :.i:e roDioei} cnarc;-. R.8J; L„ .e imorruation was subsequently 
amended, charging Green with one count of "heft frum a person, a 
f-^ e.- • i d--.T^ '"-£? - - '. in 6 4 04 
:1995; and 76-6-412 • .. ..a.- - . . -. .;,e a^endea ^i.iormation also 
charged Green with f:he original count of unlawful possession of 
At a uearing ... Green's Motion to Quash, hr^j; ^ecember 15, 
.--- Gre^:- m ^ : * dismiss or reduce the charge of theft from a 
.^.24 36;:;* .:uuii ienied the :,J:IGI:. - -i . . 
Green also filed a motion in limine to quash subsequently 
discovered evidence regarding the charge of unlawful possession of 
drug paraphernalia in light of the State's earlier concession that 
there was no evidence going to that charge. R.42-48. 
On January 13, 1999, Green entered a conditional guilty plea 
to one count of attempted theft from a person, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-6-
412 (1) (a) (iv) . R.56-65,91; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) (1999) 
(governing conditional guilty pleas); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah App. 1988). A prison term of 0-5 years was imposed but 
stayed by the trial court. R.70,92. Green was then placed on 
probation for thirty-six months. R.68-69,92. Green timely appeals 
from his conditional guilty plea. R.74. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 14, 1998, Zarah Welch ("Welch") waited at Murray 
High School to meet her friend Edward Green. R.89[4] . Green had 
arranged to meet Welch in order that Welch might loan him some 
money. R.89[5,18]. Welch agreed but told Green that she would 
have to accompany him to a store in order to break a fifty dollar 
bill before she could give him the money. Id. 
Green arrived in a car driven by another young man ("driver") , 
and accompanied by two other young men. R.89[6,10]. Green stepped 
out of the car and approached Welch; the other men remained in the 
car. Green kissed Welch, then, as if he was about to hug her, he 
put his hands in the two side pockets of her jacket, one hand in 
each pocket. R.89[8,20-21] . Green pulled out Welch's fifty dollar 
4 
bil 3 R.89[8] Welch told Green to give the bill back and grabbed 
fc •  ii 1 : I i 8S [ 8 2 8 ] 3 <= < ; r it I:i u ; •< I u .• 1 1 J ] I 1 J ] ii ] ] n . 1 : f 
We1ch's reach. Id. 
Green gestured Welch, to get into the car, R. 89 [15 ,21 ] Welch 
got :i i lto tl ie bac] : se at
 # e :: :p] jl it Gr eei l was oi lly 
teasing and that she would get the money back once :i n the car. 
R.8 9 [14,16,2 9-30] , Green then urged Welch to get out of the car, 
which si ie di d R 8 9 [2 5 2 9] . Gr eei l si n rt: tl ie ca:i : doo] : bi it ji n: i iped 
back into the car through the open window wl :i i ] e still in possession 
of the fifty doliar bill. i^ . 89 L9 , 22 , 29 3 0" 
The driver began to drive away. -.lch 1 IUI ig oi lto 
the car an u ran alongside .L: ru- wa^ unable :o keei up as the car 
accelerated rir ~ ? *" Sne ever.rua~.lv leii and the car drove 
over he. . c -t ^  , , .j^e was :._; ^: L;.^  back tires as the car 
drove off, resulting ^nn^iie.- requ: _r.g hospitalization. 
] ~'- ?> - • i ' iware of any 
attempt: i,y -jiccL to contact :.er aftei L . ^ O . ..cidet 3R: .89 [25] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Tl ie ti: :ii a] ::> :: i ii: t • ax red as a matt si : :: f .1! a ; ; :i i I d Erny :i i ig Green' s 
motion to quash the second degr ee felony cl large of theft from a 
person, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76- 6-412(1) (a) (iv) or, 
a ] t e i: n a t i ^  r e ] ;; t c :i : e d i i c e 11 i a t c h a r g e t : 11 i = :: ] a s s B m :i s d e m e a n o r 
offense of theft of property valued at less than $300, S e e Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (d) . Both offenses proscribe 
. :: t ;; e 1: 11 I a II a t: t e r o f' f e n s e c a i r :i e s i :ii 1 1 :i :i t: a ] e s s e r 
penalty. Accordingly, federal and state Equal Protection and Due 
5 
Process compel the determination that Green is entitled to be 
charged and sentenced pursuant to the statute carrying the less 
severe sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING 
GREEN'S MOTION TO QUASH THE CHARGE OF THEFT FROM A PERSON, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO REDUCE THE CHARGE 
TO THEFT OF PROPERTY VALUED AT LESS THAN $300, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH STATUTES ARE 
DUPLICATIVE YET CARRY DIFFERENT PENALTIES. 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
grant Green's motion to either quash or reduce the charge of theft 
from a person, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (a) (iv) . 
The elements of the theft from a person statute are duplicative of 
the elements of theft of property valued at less than $3 00, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1) (d) . Moreover, theft of 
property valued at less than $300, a class B misdemeanor, carries 
with it a lesser penalty than theft from a person, a second degree 
felony. Accordingly, under State v. Shondel, 453 P. 2d 146 (Utah 
1969) and its progeny, Green is entitled to the benefit of the 
statute carrying the lesser penalty. 
The well established rule is that a statute creating 
a crime should be sufficiently certain that persons of 
ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law may know 
how to conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair 
and legal concomitant of that rule is that such a penal 
statute should be similarly clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its 
violation. 
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule that 
where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser. 
Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted). 
6 
In State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Ut :ah 1986), the Supreme 
Coi n !:: : dent: f:i e ::i the "anal y I:::i ::a ] framewc i: 1 ::" f :: :i : e1 a] i lat i i ig Shondel 
claims: 
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are 
significant differences between offenses and so that the 
exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties 
depending on which of two statutory sections a prosecutor 
chooses to charge. To allow that would be to allow a 
form of arbitrariness that is foreign to oi lr system of 
law, 
Id. ('juct ; .^ ^ot L'-- . orydi. 
xx
 [W] here two statutes proscribe the same behavior, but impose 
different penalties the defendant is e^ * -rled - o the lesser 
•citing- Shondel, 453 P. 2d at I48);;see also State v. Loveless, 581 
P . 2 d ^ '"? ^  ^ 7^ n / T i t - ^ V i Q 7 o • ' h o +- o c? •*- -f- <^ -v- .-^ ..- t- o -v~rn ^ ^ i ^ Q w h e t hQ~K~ *~ W O 
l i L d L - . . . '"I: b" £. 1 ._•:: ' • • .. . : I . i • • ; 3 
contain the same elements. See Gomez, 72 2 P. 2d b*:. 74 9; see also 
State
 L 945 P.2d 145, 14 V (Ur-'- r- ' '•:- 7 , . 
Ir. : r.e event that t-wn statues Gw- ,.^ .^  ..::erent elements; an 
additional consideration under S I londe1 \ whether "there is a 
3-1*" ".al 1-a = :r f-r " * l-cr-r 1--it: ^  re classif i ~-.r : ?,: ,"" I :.e .i it 945 P. 2d 
at . ^ - . ^ State v. -JiaiK, 63 2 P. 2d 84.. , , « (Utah 1981)); see 
also Gomez, 722 P.2a at 749-50) (citations omitted), 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more 
severe penalty fox a particular type of crime than the 
penalty which is imposed with respect to the general 
category of crimes to which the special crime is related 
or of which it is a subcategory, 
As long as the legislative classifications are not 
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a 
general and a specific provision of the criminal laws 
does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even 
though one violation : -* ^ uh-iec*- to a greater sentence 
; 
Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44 (citations omitted). 
Where a defendant is charged and/or sentenced in violation of 
Shondel, his or her rights under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions are 
violated. See Kent, 945 P.2d at 147 (citing Clark, 632 P.2d at 
843; Gomez, 722 P.2d at 750; see also Bryan, 709 P.2d at 261 
(quoting State v. Twitchell, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1959)); 
Shondel,4 53 P.2d at 148; Duran, 722 P.2d at 987. 
The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty of or property, without 
due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Its federal 
counterpart states: "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV. 
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those 
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 
1991) . 
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
translates into protections that are similar to those arising out 
8 
of the Due Process Clause and is likewise an intrinsic part of the 
Shondel doctrine. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that states shall not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See 
also Utah Const. Art. I, § 2 ("all free governments are founded on 
their authority for their equal protection and benefit"). Under 
the federal Equal Protection Clause, "persons similarly situated 
should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances 
should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) ; see also McLaughlin 
v. Florida, 379 U.S., 184, 190 (1964). 
With respect to the Shondel doctrine and the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Bryan Court stated the following: 
[A] prosecutor should not have the freedom to choose 
between charging either a felony or a misdemeanor when 
the two crimes have exactly the same substantive 
elements. . . . [T]hat situation would deny defendant and 
others in his class equal protection of the laws. . . . 
[Courts] cannot disregard [the] responsibility to assure 
the rational and evenhanded application of the criminal 
laws. Equal protection of the law guarantees like 
treatment of all those who are similarly situated. 
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that 
there are significant differences between offenses and so 
that the exact same conduct is not subject to different 
penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections 
a prosecutor chooses to charge. 
Id. at 261-63 (citing Twitchell, 333 P.2d at 1077). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in denying Green's motion to quash or reduce the charge of 
theft from a person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (a) (iv) . Green is actually 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty attached to the class 
9 
B misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued at less than 
$300, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(d), because 
that statute contains elements identical to those of the theft from 
a person statute, yet carries with it the lighter penalty 
associated with a class B misdemeanor. 
Green was charged with one count of theft from a person, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 and 
§ 76-6-412(1)(a)(iv). Section 76-6-404, the general theft 
provision, provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, which classifies the various forms of 
theft, states: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: (a) as a felony of the 
second degree if the: . . . (iv) property is stolen from 
the person of another. 
The charge under this particular theft provision was based on 
Welch's testimony that Green took a fifty dollar bill from the 
pocket of a coat that she wore, then drove off in a car with three 
other young men without returning the money. R.89[8,20-24,28,30] . 
Together, these statutes proscribe the conduct alleged by Welch. 
However, section 76-6-412 (1) (d) proscribes the same alleged 
conduct and contains the same elements, yet carries a lesser 
penalty. It states: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: . . . (d) as a class B 
misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
10 
Under the present set of alleged facts, Green could have been 
charged under the misdemeanor theft statute since the value of the 
property taken was fifty dollars, well within the $300 statutory 
limit. R.89[8]. Moreover, 76-6-412(1)(d) does not expressly 
require that the property not be taken from the person of another. 
In addition, the "from a person" language contained in section 
76-6-412(1) (a) (iv) does not constitute a meaningful or 
"significant" distinction such that prosecution under that statute 
is appropriate here. Bryan, 709 P. 2d at 263. Indeed, case law 
from other jurisdictions suggest that the "from a person" language 
contained in similar theft statutes extends to situations where the 
property is taken from the possession, control and/or proximity of 
the victim, and not necessarily from the person in a literal sense, 
thus blurring the legislative distinction between the two statutes 
at issue here. 
For example, in People v. Evans, 612 P. 2d 1153 (Colo. App. 
1980), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the defendant's 
taking of a purse from a shopping cart constituted a "taking from 
the person of another" under Colorado's theft from a person statute 
even though the purse was not on the victim's person. Id. at 1156. 
The Court reasoned that the purse was under the victim's control 
and in her possession insofar as it was in a shopping cart that she 
was pushing at the time of the theft. Id. ; see also Mack v. State, 
465 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Cr. App. 1971) (theft of purse from grocery 
shopping cart was theft from the person whose purse it was and 
whose hand was on the shopping cart from whence it was stolen). 
11 
Given that "from a person" has been construed to encompass 
situations where property was not necessarily taken from the 
victim's person, but instead from his or her proximity, control or 
possession, the legislative distinction between section 76-6-
412 (1) (a) (iv) (theft from a person) and section 76-6-412 (1) (d) 
(theft of property under $300) is not sufficiently clear to 
alleviate the Equal Protection and Due Process concerns of 
arbitrary legislative classifications or prosecutions in this case. 
See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 750; Kent, 945 P.2d at 147. 
In fact, the present case is similar to Bryan, 709 P. 2d at 
263, where the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant's 
sentence pursuant to the felony manslaughter statute. The 
manslaughter statute at issue there required as one of its elements 
that the actor operate a vehicle "in reckless disregard of the 
safety of others." Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-43.10(a) 
(1953 as amended)). The misdemeanor offense of negligent homicide 
similarly, although not identically, proscribed behavior that 
" [r]ecklessly causes the death of another." Id. (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (a) (1953 as amended)) . Given that there was no 
"significant difference" in the recklessness elements of each 
offense, the Bryan Court held that the two statutes contained 
identical elements. Id. This, in turn, afforded the prosecutor 
"impermissible discretion to choose a defendant's penalty based 
upon which statute the prosecutor [chose] to charge under." Id. 
As in Bryan, and in light of the broad definition of "from a 
person," which includes scenarios where property is not literally 
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taken from the person of another, there is not a "significant 
difference," Bryan, 709 P. 2d at 263, between the theft from a 
person statute, a second degree felony, and theft of property 
valued at less than $300, a class B misdemeanor. Consequently, the 
prosecutor below had an impermissible amount of discretion in 
opting to pursue the greater offense of theft from a person. Id. 
Green's rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 
therefore, compel the determination that he is entitled to the 
benefit of the class B theft charge carrying the lighter sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in denying Green's motion to quash or reduce the theft from 
a person charge, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(iv), to the charge of theft of 
property valued at less than $300, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (d) . Green 
therefore respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand 
his sentence.1 
C^)A\.ii\ixA±r <L KjMi 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appealant 
1
 The State indicated in the plea agreement that should Green 
prevail on appeal, he should be sentenced under the class B 
misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued less than $300, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(d), that he shall have 
credit for time served, and that he shall not have to serve further 
jail time. R.63. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD DON GREEN, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 
Judge: 
Date: 
E^JILKINSOJsfr 
February 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jaredl 
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED 
Prosecutor: HAMP, RICHARD G. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 4, 1976 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/13/1999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
'H. 
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Case No: 981921542 
Date: Feb 26, 1999 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $5000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $5000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Amount Due: $0 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDERS 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $925.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Page 2 
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Case No: 981921542 
Date: Feb 26, 1999 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Obtain an evaluation from Vocational Rehabilitation. 
Defendant may perform community service at AP&P's discretion. 
Do not associate with drug users or alcoholics. 
DEFENDANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FULL RESTITUTION IN THIS MATTER. 
Dated this ^ ^ d a y of y ^>£ , 1 9 ^ ^ . 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
- (c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
0*) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997 J 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they 
have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may 
require. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
f law o . 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
ARTICLE VI 
[MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS] 
[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of of-
fice — Religious tests prohibited.] 
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adop-
tion of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under 
this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members 
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both 
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at amy election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
